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Abstract 
Petroleum refinery consists of numerous process units in operation, which are subjected 
to diverse accident risks in day-to-day operations under extreme operating conditions. 
Due to the complexity of petroleum refinery operations, any failure can lead to major 
accident and a huge financial loss for a petroleum refining company. However, petroleum 
refinery operations can be disrupted by various risk elements from the organization, 
technical, operational and external latent conditions. Risk elements are often inherent in 
operations, which can be based on uncertain knowledge, oversight and lack of perception 
of interactive events that can lead to disruption. In order to circumvent events that can 
cause disruption in a petroleum refinery, the criticality of the risk elements and their 
attributes that are associated with Petroleum Refinery Process Units (PRPU) operations 
need to be investigated. Therefore, there is a need to identify and assess the most critical 
risk elements and attributes that can interact to cause the disruption of operational 
reliability and availability of a petroleum refinery process unit. Hence, this article 
proposes a robust fuzzy linguistic assessment methodology for identification and 
assessment of PRPU risk elements and their attributes. The methodology deals with the 
main challenges of utilising expert’s subjective judgements, in terms of the assessment of 
PRPU risk elements under uncertain situations. The result of the evaluation and ranking 
of PRPU risk elements and their attributes can provide salient risk information to duty 
holders and decision makers in the petroleum refinery in order to prioritise resources for 
risk management of the most critical attributes of the risk elements.  
Keywords: Petroleum refinery process unit; Risk element; Risk management; Fuzzy 
Linguistic Preference Relation; Subjective Judgment. 
1. Introduction  
Petroleum refineries are complex infrastructures with various process units which can 
perform multiple phase operations. Petroleum Refineries Process Units (PRPU) are 
capital intensive and a constant flow production infrastructure with a high level of risk 
that can cause catastrophic accidents. However, the pressure of daily demand and 
commitment to production target in operations of most refineries around the globe has 
led to a strong push of safety boundaries, which has led to occurrences of major accidents. 
The breach of safety boundaries in a petroleum refinery domain is a result of combination 
of multiple interactive events. These series of interactive events often precipitate into the 
disruption of petroleum refinery operations. Based on historical cases of major accidents 
reported in the petroleum refining industry, it is evident that the build-up of interactive 
events is due to lapses in risk management. For instance, Saleh et al., (2014), emphasize 
that the violation of safety diagnosis principles can affect operators risk perception 
towards emerging hazard, because of the shrinkage in knowledge and situation awareness 
of unfolding hazardous events.      
Rodriguez et al., (2011), explain that the meaningful implication of accident reporting 
can boost healthy safety climate, if the lesson learnt from the accident is utilized to 
enhance the prevention of future accidents. This has been one of the challenges in the risk 
management of petroleum refinery operations, because operators sometimes fail to utilise 
the primary mechanism from shared lessons learnt from major accidents. Rather, they 
predominantly focus their attention on safety performance indicators for the conception 
of the current safety level of operations in order to enhance organizational means of 
controlling risk. Major accidents in petroleum refineries such as ConocoPhillips-Humber 
refinery accident 2001, BP-Texas City refinery accident 2005, Tesoro Anacortes refinery 
accident 2010, Amuay oil refinery accident 2012, Chevron Richmond refinery accident 
2012 and Bolshoy Uluy Krasnoyarsk refinery accident 2014, have raised important 
questions about the level of safety of petroleum refinery process units operations. 
According to Pasman et al., (2013), maintaining adequate safety level from time to time 
is a difficult task because of the need to balance productivity and budget constraints. 
Knegtering and Pasman (2009), observe that lapses or failure of petroleum refining 
companies in their risk management process gradually builds up events, which eventually 
escalate into an accident. This sometimes occurs when corporate management fails to 
commit tangible resources and expertise to their risk management program (Wood et al., 
2013).  Major accidents in petroleum refineries reveal that organization notions to safety, 
when accident risks are not perceived as a threat, has resulted in the degradation of safety 
attitude and neglect of early warning of risks. Owing to lack of insight of the operators or 
duty holder’s in terms of hazard awareness, reveals, how, early warnings of undesired 
events could have been utilised to prevent a disastrous accident. This observation 
indicates that early warning is important in order to mitigate major accident risks, by 
providing situation awareness at the level in the organization where corrective actions can 
be implemented.  According to Saleh et al., (2014), the capability to detect or analyse a 
hazardous condition of a system or any safety degradation is tantamount to sustaining the 
safety of a system. An important part of the in-depth analysis conducted by Saleh et al., 
(2014) indicates that lack of safety diagnosis ability in terms of perception or situation 
awareness can lead to potential concealment of petroleum refinery operations and hazard 
escalation.  
Isimite and Rubini, (2016) and Manca and Brambilla (2012), emphasize that lack of 
resilience in organisational culture towards management of safety climate, process safety 
management, and human elements are contributory events that have led to an accident in 
process facilities including petroleum refineries. All the aforementioned issues, to a great 
extent, incubate safety barrier weakness, latent failures or allow the interactions of major 
accident hazards at different levels of operations. This shows that over time, the risk level 
of major accident hazards need to be systematically evaluated, in order to monitor safety 
level, and to provide the necessary risk information for complex decision making in a 
petroleum refinery domain. Several petroleum refinery process unit accidents have 
resulted in significant loss of lives, damage to properties, environmental pollution and 
disruption of economic activities due to fires, explosions, and process related failures.  
 According to the CSB (2007) investigation report on the 2005 BP-Texas City refinery 
accident, the catastrophe was initiated by looming organizational safety deficiencies at all 
stages of refinery process units operations. In addition, years of inconsistent reporting and 
recording of numerous near miss events and the lack of investigation on the growing risks 
to the mechanical integrity program for process equipment’s of the Texas City refinery 
process units, massively contributed to the March 2005 disaster (Thomson, 2013; 
Knegtering and Pasman, 2009). Duty holders in the petroleum refinery industry tend to 
conceal salient information relating to major accident hazards or major events 
information, to protect their company reputation. Also, concealing major events 
information, portrays effective safety performance of their operations, to benefit from low 
insurance costs, and to create a lower risk perception about petroleum refinery operations 
to the regulators, government and the public (Nolan, 2014). Irrespective of the continuous 
development in safety design methods and operating procedures to overcome the high 
risks, which pose significant threat to life of personnel in PRPU environment, recordable 
losses due to major accidents still occur (Reniers and Amyotte, 2012; Vinnem et al., 2012; 
Knegtering and Pasman, 2009). Therefore, it is crucial to readdress the issue of PRPU 
risk management relating to technical, organizational, operational and external risk 
problems, which can result in high risk of disruption of PRPU operations. In order to 
mitigate high risk of PRPU accident, it is important to analyse and prioritise the 
significant root causes of disruption of PRPU operations, in order to improve the risk 
management process in a PRPU domain. Therefore, critical risk elements and their 
associated attributes that can cause the disruption of a PRPU operation must be analysed 
and prioritised in order to determine their level of influence in contributing to the 
disruption of petroleum refinery operations. Proactively identifying and prioritising the 
risk elements of refinery process units is vital to risk management of petroleum refinery 
process units operations. The outcome of the evaluation and the prioritization process can 
be utilised to support decision makers and duty holders’ aspirations in the petroleum 
refining industry, to enhance adequate decision-making, in terms of allocating resources 
efficiently. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a review of petroleum 
refinery risk elements. Section 3 presents a transparent description of the fuzzy linguistic 
assessment methodology, which was utilised in this study. Section 4 presents a case study 
analysis based on the methodology steps. Discussion and conclusion are presented in 
Sections 5 and 6. 
2. Refineries process unit risk elements  
The process of investigating and identifying critical risk elements for major hazard 
facilities like petroleum refinery process units has to be rigorous due to the complexity 
and diversity of their operations. The diagnosis of the risk elements and their attributes is 
often based on the accident investigation reports obtained from US Chemical Safety 
Board (CSB), UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), and Analysis, Research and 
Information on Accidents (ARIA) database (ARIA (2012); CSB (2008); CSB (2001); 
HSE (2005);HSE (2003)and HSE (1997). The selection of the most critical risk elements 
and their attributes is carried out based on a comprehensive review of the major accidents 
from the aforementioned sources and brainstorming session with field experts in 
petroleum and gas refinery operations.  
The risk elements and their associated attributes are represented in a hierarchical model. 
The model is an illustrative structure that depicts the common interactions of risk 
elements and their attributes, in order to analyse the disruption risk of PRPU operation. 
The overall effects of the risk elements and their attributes on PRPU operations can be 
quantify by incorporating an effective risk modelling methodology. The most significant 
risk elements that can cause interruption of petroleum refinery process units’ safety and 
effectiveness in operation are enumerated in Table 1 and are further discussed in detail in 
Sections 2.1 to 2.4.  The hierarchical model for petroleum refinery, process units’ risk 
elements and their attributes is presented in Figure 1. 
2.1 Technical risk elements  
In a major hazard facility like a petroleum refinery, a variety of potentially hazardous 
products are being produced from crude oil, therefore, it is very important that the 
technical reliability of functional assets used in refinery process units is achieved at an 
optimum level to enable smooth operations. Any failure or deficiency in technical 
measures and performance can cause significant issues, such as process equipment, 
instrument, piping and utility system failures, which can interrupt smooth operations of 
refinery process units and cause huge financial consequences. Due to the complexity of 
technology to control and maintain operational reliability of refinery process units and 
other interconnected structures, there is a need to consider the aforementioned risk issues 
in order to identify and understand their interactions and influences with other potential 
hazards that can lead to accidents.  
2.2 Operational risk elements  
Refinery process units consist of several interconnections of complex equipment and 
machinery, which operate, in extreme conditions. Any deterioration in operating 
performance of the equipment and machinery under severe conditions in the refinery 
process unit environment, can result in a terrible operational hazard that can sometimes 
affect operations such as start-up, shutdown, maintenance, processing and storage (Shin 
2014; Shin 2013; Khan and Amyotte, 2007). If a significant operational hazard is not 
critically addressed in an appropriate fashion, it may increase the probability of 
operational risks, which may result in higher operating costs, production loss, and 
dangerous situations that could cause a serious accident. In order to reduce high risk of 
operational failure and boost refinery process unit’s operational availability and reliability, 
focus must be on operational risk elements that are considered as important initiator of 
disruptions to refinery process unit operations. Attributes such as deviations from 
operational procedure, operator incompetency, inadequate communications and 
inadequate maintenance procedure are identified as the most critical elements of 
disruption risk that can threaten refinery process units’ operational reliability and 
availability.   
2.3 Organizational risk elements  
In the petroleum refining industry, organizational drive for efficiency and cost cutting can 
be a direct influence on overall safety perception and the safety level in the organization. 
Organization safety alertness and focus is crucial to proactive evaluation and management 
of safety in a high risk critical system like a petroleum refinery. High risk of process unit 
operations needs to be anticipated and appropriate organizational safety management 
approach should be adopted in a systematic manner to prevent the risk or to mitigate the 
consequences of risk. In a petroleum refinery, organizational safety management under-
performance is a critical issue that has wreaked havoc by contributing to major refinery 
accidents. For example, the BP Texas refinery accident in 2005 and Chevron Richmond 
refinery accident in 2012 provides a clear view of the significant impact of organizational 
safety management under-performance, as a major factor in the build-up to the accident. 
In order to maintain a high level of organizational safety performance in petroleum and 
gas refineries, it is important to consider some significant root causes of organizational 
risk elements. Examples are inappropriate management procedure, inappropriate decision 
making, inadequate staffing, poor safety monitoring and auditing, and lack of safety 
training and drills.  
2.4 External risk elements  
To reduce the risk of petroleum refinery process unit accidents or mitigate the 
consequences, there is a need to address core external risk elements, which have 
contributed significantly to accidents in the past, in petroleum and gas refineries. Root 
causes of external risk element, such as natural hazards, sabotage and terrorist attacks, 
have contributed to disruption of PRPU operations.  
Table 1: Significant risk elements and attributes 
Level 2 risk element Level 3 attributes 
𝐸1   Technical risk element 𝐸11    Process equipment failure 
 𝐸12    Instrument failure 
 𝐸13    Piping system failure 
 𝐸14    Utility system failure 
𝐸2   Organizational risk element 𝐸21    Inappropriate management policy/procedure 
 𝐸22    Inappropriate decision making 
 𝐸23    Inadequate staffing 
 𝐸24    Poor safety monitoring/auditing  
 𝐸25    Lack of safety training/drill 
𝐸3   Operational risk element 𝐸31     Deviation from operation procedure 
 𝐸32     Operator incompetency 
 𝐸33     Inadequate communication 
 𝐸34     Inadequate maintenance procedure 
𝐸4    External risk element 𝐸41     Natural hazard 
 𝐸42     Sabotage 
 𝐸43     Terrorist attack 
 
The hierarchical levels of the disruption risks elements presented above is based on robust 
literature review and meticulous study of major accidents in the oil and gas-refining 
domain. The main attributes of the risk elements (organizational, operational and external) 
describe human factor issues that have been recurrent incidents or part of contributory 
causes to major accidents. Notable accident reports and literatures such as CSB, (2007); 
CSB (2014a) CSB (2014b); CSB (2014c); CSB (2017a); CSB (2017b); Qi et al. (2012) 
Baybutt, (2003) have all emphases the gap  for improving knowledge on 
human/organizational factors as a vital paradigm to improve system safety in the oil and 
gas-refining refining sector. The element of human factors, which are represented as 
attributes associated with organizational, operational, and external in the hierarchy model 
present in this study are in concur with the underlying human and organizational factors 
broken down into categories in Gordon, (1998) and Bea, (1998). The hierarchical model 
integrate Schönbeck et al. (2010) ideology, which indicates that the operation of a highly 
risky socio technical system is reliant on the interaction of technical, organisational, 
managerial, human, social and environmental elements. Therefore, the hierarchical levels 
presents a corroborated picture of a causative model that fulfil the mechanism of a holistic 
approach for modelling disruption risks in a petroleum refinery domain.   
Øien et al. (2011) conducted a research on the concepts safety indicator and risk indicator 
required to measure safety or risk. The main function of the concepts is a measure of 
safety performance to describe the safety level within an organization, establishment, or 
work unit. Their study is structured according to a combination of two perspective in 
relation to develop a search for accidents causals considering the path from technical, to 
human and organisational causes. Thus, there perspective is viewed in the light of a 
predictive versus a retrospective view. In retrospect, the measure of establishing the 
concepts of safety/risk indicator in terms of technical–human–organizational perspective 
and further extends to look at remote causes as external factor. Therefore, Øien et al. 
(2011) substantiate that the proactive approaches for the assessment of underlying factors’ 
influence on safety/ risk can be illustrated by reversing the development moving from 
technical, to human, to organizational  and to external factor for the purpose of accident 
investigation. This indicates that there is interdependences in terms of analysing the 
interaction path among the underlying factors. Nevertheless, there are challenges relating 
to dilemma with lack of data and lack of consensus in terms of prediction or estimating 
the path of dependencies. This have to do with biases of experts’, because 
interdependencies of factors are measured based on different approaches, which can lead 
to oversimplification of influences path in a safety causal model (Mohaghegh et al., 2009).   
It is recognizable in risk modelling of major accidents in oil and gas refining domain that 
organizational factor, technical system failure coupled with human and external events 
are always defined in the scope of investigation.  
Overview of the notion pathway of risk models from technical, to human, to 
organizational and external factor; differentiate the theoretical interest of researchers in 
the safety community. Hence, this study concentrate majorly on the background 
knowledge of experts, overview of lesson from major accident causal in relation to 
technical, organizational operational, and external element of disruption risks to 
determine the significance of risk elements and their  attributes using a quantitative 











In order to enhance a comprehensive risk management of petroleum refinery process unit 
operations, it is very important to carry out effective risk modelling of disruption risks of 
PRPU operations. Therefore, identifying and assessing the most significant PRPU risk 
elements and attributes will contribute a first phase of proactive risk management of 
PRPUs operations. A systematic approach based on utilising a Fuzzy Linguistic 
Preference Relation (FLPR) technique is incorporated into the methodology steps in this 
paper. The methodology will provide the flexibility to quantify experts’ judgements 
qualitatively, in order to analyse the risks of PRPU in a situation where the availability 
and consistency of risk data is uncertain. The following steps present a transparent 
description of the methodology: 
Step 1: Identification of risk elements and attributes. 
Step 2: Develop a generic hierarchical model based on the risk elements and attributes.                                                                                     
Step 3: Linguistic assessment of risk elements and attributes.                                                                                                         
Step 4: Apply an FLPR approach to determine the weight of all risk elements and 
attributes in the hierarchical structure. 
Step 5:  Ranking decision on each risk element and attributes according to the 
decreasing order of values. 
 3.1 Identification of risk elements and attributes of PRPU disruption  
In view of the complexity of refineries, process units, structures and operations, the risk 
elements and attributes of disruption risk to PRPU operation are identified based on 
information extracted from a literature review of historical accident reports, literatures on 
accident analysis and brainstorming session with domain experts. The process of 
identification of PRPU risk elements and attributes is important to have in-depth 
knowledge and a real understanding of the PRPU disruption risks problem.  
3.2 Hierarchical structure of petroleum refineries process unit disruption 
risk 
An integrated hierarchical structure of refinery process units risk elements relationship, 
which incorporates important diverse details, is developed. The hierarchical structure for 
the PRPU risk elements provides systematic interpretation of risk elements interactions, 
such that an attribute at a lower level is linked to the risk element at higher level. For 
instance, attribute at lower levels as process equipment failure is a subset element of 
technological risk element at a higher level. For the purpose of this study, the term 
‘element’ is used to describe part of something, particularly situations or activities that 
can initiate hazardous events (Wu et al., 2015). Figure 1 presents the detailed hierarchical 
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3.3 Linguistic assessment of risk elements and attributes 
Linguistic variables are regarded as expressions in natural or artificial language, which 
can be implemented to indicate the preference value of one criteria over another in a 
decision-based hierarchical model. For the purpose of this study, the idea of using the 
linguistic assessment variables is to deal with complexity or inconsistency of decision 
maker’s opinion in order to express it in a quantitative manner. Linguistic expressions 
such as; absolutely not important, very strongly not important, essentially not important, 
weakly not important, equally important, very strongly important and absolutely 
important are used for pairwise comparisons of risk elements and attributes of disruption 
risk of PRPU operations. The linguistic expressions can expressed in fuzzy numbers 
based on the Triangular Fuzzy Number (TFN) proposed by (Chen and Hwang, 1992). 
TFN is a fuzzy set function that can be adopted to deal with the uncertainty and vagueness 
associated with decision makers’ opinion in terms of solving practical problems. TFN 
provides decision makers’ with a reasonable way to represent subjective and imprecise 
information in a logical manner. For a fuzzy number, ?̃?, TFN can be denoted by ?̃? = 
(𝑙, 𝑚, 𝑢) where 𝑙, 𝑚 and 𝑢 are expressed as lower, upper and median bounds of the fuzzy 
number. Based on operational laws of TFN in Wang and Chen (2008), the algebraic 
operations of any two triangular fuzzy numbers ?̃?1  and ?̃?2  can be expressed in the 
following manner:  
Addition operation ⊕: 
 
?̃?1 ⊕ ?̃?2 = (𝑙1,  𝑚1,  𝑢1) ⊕ (𝑙2,  𝑚2,  𝑢2)  = (𝑙1 + 𝑙2 , 𝑚1 + 𝑚2, 𝑢1 +





Subtraction operation ⊝:  
       
?̃?1 ⊝ ?̃?2 = (𝑙1,  𝑚1,  𝑢1) ⊖ (𝑙2,  𝑚2,  𝑢2) =  (𝑙1 − 𝑢2 , 𝑚1 − 𝑚2, 𝑢1 − 𝑙2  )                                                                                                                          (2)
Multiplication operation ⨂:  
 
?̃?1  ⨂ ?̃?2  = (𝑙1,  𝑚1,  𝑢1) ⊗ (𝑙2,  𝑚2,  𝑢2) = (𝑙1𝑙2 , 𝑚1𝑚2, 𝑢1𝑢2  )  ≅ for 𝑙1 >
 0, 𝑚1 > 0, 𝑢1 > 0.        
   
      (3) 
Division operation ⊘: 
 









) for 𝑙1 > 0, 𝑚1 >
0, 𝑢1 > 0              
                                                                                                            
       (4) 
Logarithm operation:  
       
log𝑘(?̃?) = (log𝑘 𝑙, log𝑘 𝑚, log𝑘 𝑢,) where k is base.                                                                      (5)
 Reciprocal operation:  
    
(?̃?)
−1
= (𝑙, 𝑗, 𝑢)−1 ≅   for 𝑙, 𝑚, 𝑢 >  0          (6) 
The TFN membership function is expressed in Equation (7).  




    𝑙 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑚
𝑢−𝑥
𝑢−𝑚
  𝑚 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑢
0,                            
                                                                                                        (7)
3.3.1 Triangular fuzzy conversion scale for pairwise comparison 
Appropriate selection of fuzzy scale for pairwise comparisons of fuzzy opinions of 
experts is adopted from Wang and Chen (2011). The pairwise comparison scale is used 
in this study to establish the intensity of risk elements of petroleum refineries process 
units disruption risk based on expert judgement, which are represented using linguistic 
terms with corresponding triangular fuzzy numbers as shown in Table 2. In addition, 
Figure 2 shows the triangular fuzzy importance scale.   
  1  0.1 0.9
1
0
  0.2   0.3   0.4   0.5   0.6 0.7 0.8
Figure 2. Triangular fuzzy importance scale adapted from Wang and Chen, 2011 
Table 2: Fuzzy linguistic assessment variables 





Equally important (EQ) (0.45, 0.5, 0.55)  
Intermediate value between equally 
important and weakly more important  
(WE)  
(0.5, 0.55, 0.6)  (0.4, 0.45, 0.5) 
Weakly more important (WK)  (0.55, 0.6, 0.65)  (0.35, 0.4, 0.45) 
Intermediate value between weakly more 




 (0.275, 0.325, 0.375) 
Strongly more important (ST) (0.7,0.75, 0.8)  (0.2, 0.25, 0.3) 
Intermediate value between ST and very 
strongly more important (VT) 
(0.775, 0.825, 
0.875) 
 (0.125, 0.175, 0.225) 
Very strongly more important (VS) (0.85,0.9,0.95)  (0.05, 0.1, 0.15) 
Intermediate value between very strongly 
more important and absolutely  important 
(VA) 
(0.9, 0.95, 1)  (0, 0.05, 0.1) 
Absolutely  important (AB) (0.95, 1, 1)  (0, 0, 0.05) 
The inverse of the linguistic variables are 
(LWE), (LWK), (LWS), (LST), (LVT), 
(LVS), (LVA), (LVS), and (LAB). These 
inverse linguistic variables are 




where LWE is the inverse of WE, LWK is the inverse of WK, LWS is the inverse of WS, 
LST is the inverse of ST, LVT is the inverse of VT, LVA is the inverse of VA, LVS is 
the inverse of VS and LAB is the inverse of AB.  
3.3.2 Determining the weight of experts  
It is important in a decision making process to determine the weights of experts employed, 
to give their subjective opinion on risk elements or attributes that can affect the reliability 
of a system under investigation. Therefore, the reliability and quality of experts’ 
subjective opinions are based on the assigned weights of each expert using criteria such 
as experience/knowledge (EK), academic qualifications (AQ), and industrial position (IP). 
The aforementioned criteria have been presented in Table 3. Hence, the experts’ weights 
can be calculated in a simple manner by using the Delphi method to obtain the weight 
score of each expert (𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝑛). Then, the weighting scores of the experts and their 
weights can be obtained based on Equations 8 and 9. 
Weighting score of 𝐸𝑖 = IP score of 𝐸𝑖  +  EK score of 𝐸𝑖 +  AQ score of 𝐸𝑖            (8)                                                                                 
W(𝐸𝑖) =
Weight score of 𝐸𝑖
∑ Weight score of 𝐸𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                                                  (9)     
where W(𝐸𝑖) denotes the weight of expert 𝑖.                                                                                                   
In this study, the integration of the fuzzy judgments of a group of experts concerning 𝑛 −
1  pairwise comparison values (𝑝12 , 𝑝23 , … ..  𝑝(𝑛−1)𝑛)  was utilised to construct a 
consistent fuzzy linguistic preference relation matrix. The aggregated fuzzy judgment 
values of ‘n’ experts can be estimated using Equation 10.   
?̅?𝑖𝑗 =   {(𝑊(𝐸1)⨂?̃?𝑖𝑗
1 ) ⊕ (𝑊(𝐸2)⨂?̃?𝑖𝑗
2 ) ⊕ … … … ⊕ (𝑊(𝐸𝑛)⨂𝑝𝑖𝑗
n )}                      (10)                                                                         
where  ?̅?𝑖𝑗 is the integrated fuzzy judgment values of ‘n’ decision makers and 𝑝𝑖𝑗
n  
 indicate the fuzzy judgment value of expert n.  
 
Table 3: Weighting scores for experts 
Criteria Categories Score 
Industrial position (IP) 
Petroleum refinery manager/ Refinery      
Consultant 
Senior (refinery engineer/process 
engineer/ process safety manager) 






                                                    
3                               
2 
1 
Experience / knowledge (EK)  
≥  20 years 
11- 20 years 
6-10  years 
1-5   years 






Academic qualifications (AQ) 
PhD 









3.4 Application of an FLPR process for weight estimate  
In this study, the assessment of the relative weight of the risk elements and their attributes 
that can cause the disruption of a petroleum refinery process unit operations is important, 
in order to prioritize the risk elements and their attributes according to their levels of 
significance. The process will enhance the understanding of their impact in terms of 
disruption of PRPU operations. The FLPR procedure, which was presented in Section 3, 
is utilised in the assessment of PRPU risk elements and their associated attributes, in order 
to determine the degree of their importance.  
 The FLPR procedure lessens the difficulty and the inconsistency associated with the 
evaluation of a complex and sensitive hierarchical model problem (Wang and Chen, 2011; 
Huang et al., 2011). In terms of utilising the FLPR procedure in the estimation of the 
importance weights of the PRPU risk elements and their attributes, it provides the benefit 
of maintaining consistency of a pairwise comparison matrix of experts judgement or 
preferences (Wang and Chang 2007:Wang and Chen, 2008; Chen et al., 2011; Wang and 
Chen, 2011). In order to avoid uneven deductions in the assessment and ranking process 
of PRPU risk elements and their attributes, the FLPR procedure provides the flexibility 
for consistent comparability of the decision makers’ preference by using fuzzy linguistic 
assessments variables.   
When using the FLPR approach, it is quite easy to avoid exasperation in collecting a 
consistently sound judgement without prejudice from experts when using a questionnaire 
(Lu et al., 2013). Using FLPR approach is much more convenient and reasonable to avoid 
a complex pairwise comparison and to check for inconsistencies in the decision matrices. 
The schematic of the FLPR methodology is presented in Figure 4.   
3.4.1 Fuzzy linguistic preference relations (FLPR) 
Wang and Chen (2005, 2008, and 2010) developed the FLPR method. The method 
involves utilizing fuzzy linguistic assessment variables to construct fuzzy linguistic 
preference relation matrices based on consistent fuzzy preference relation. Chen et al., 
(2011), Wang and Chen (2011), Wang and Lin (2009) further used FLPR method in a 
suitable manner to solve multi-criteria decision-making problems. In a decision 
modelling problem, the preference of a decision maker when comparing a set of criteria 
X= (𝑥1, … … , 𝑥𝑛)  is depicted by  𝑛 × 𝑛  preference relation matrix P = [𝑝𝑖𝑗] . 𝑝𝑖𝑗  = 
𝑃(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗  ) , for all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈  {1, … … , 𝑛} . 𝑝𝑖𝑗  is depicted as the degree of importance of 
criterion 𝑥𝑖 over criterion 𝑥𝑗. Supposing 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 0.5,  it indicates that there is no difference 
between 𝑥𝑖  and 𝑥𝑗  (𝑥𝑖~ 𝑥𝑗); 𝑝𝑖𝑗 > 0.5 indicates that 𝑥𝑖  is preferred to 𝑥𝑗  (𝑥𝑖 > 𝑥𝑗); and 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 1  indicates that 𝑥𝑖  is absolutely preferred to  𝑥𝑗 , and 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 0  shows that 𝑥𝑗  is 
absolutely preferred to 𝑥𝑖. Hence, the preference matrix, P is assume to be an additive 
reciprocal given that  𝑝𝑖𝑗 + 𝑝𝑗𝑖 = 1 for all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, … . , 𝑛}.  The rationale for developing 
a fuzzy linguistic preference relations matrix for a given set of criteria X is based on the 
consistent fuzzy preference relation concept and fuzzy linguistic assessment variables.  




𝑢 ), where 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑙  and 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑢  indicates the lower and the upper bounds of the fuzzy number ?̃?, 
while 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚 relatively indicates the median value instead of crisp values 𝑃 ̃ = (𝑝𝑖𝑗).  If the 
above preference relation matrix complies with additive reciprocal consistency, then the 
following propositions are equivalent.  
Propositions   
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑙 +  𝑝𝑗𝑖 
𝑢 =  1 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, … … . . , 𝑛}                                                                           
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚 +  𝑝𝑗𝑖 
𝑚 =  1 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, … … . . , 𝑛}    
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑢 +  𝑝𝑗𝑖 
𝑙 =  1 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, … … . . , 𝑛}   
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑙 +  𝑝𝑗𝑘
𝑙  + 𝑝𝑘𝑖
𝑢  =  
3
2
 ∀i <  j < k,      
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚 +  𝑝𝑗𝑘
𝑚  + 𝑝𝑘𝑖
𝑚  =  
3
2
 ∀i <  j < k,   
  𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑢 +  𝑝𝑗𝑘
𝑢  + 𝑝𝑘𝑖
𝑙  =  
3
2
 ∀i <  j < k,     
 𝑝𝑖(𝑖+1)
𝑙  +  𝑝(𝑖+1)(𝑖+2)
𝑙  +……. + 𝑝(𝑗−1)𝑗
𝑙  + 𝑝𝑗𝑖
𝑢  =  
(𝑗−𝑖+1)
2
   ∀i <  j, 
 𝑝𝑖(𝑖+1)
𝑚  +  𝑝(𝑖+1)(𝑖+2)
𝑚  +……. + 𝑝(𝑗−1)𝑗
𝑚  + 𝑝𝑗𝑖
𝑚  =  
(𝑗−𝑖+1)
2
   ∀i <  j, 
𝑝𝑖(𝑖+1)
𝑢  +  𝑝(𝑖+1)(𝑖+2)
𝑢  +……. + 𝑝(𝑗−1)𝑗
𝑢  + 𝑝𝑗𝑖
𝑙  =  
(𝑗−𝑖+1)
2
   ∀i <  j,         
         
(11) 
In the case of decision matrix with entries which are in the interval of [-c, 1+c] given  
(𝑐 > 0)  rather than interval  [0,1],  the following transformation function is used to 
transform the obtained fuzzy numbers to preserve the reciprocity and additive consistency 
f : [-c, 1+c] → [0,1]. 
𝑓 (𝑥𝑙) =  
𝑥𝑙 +𝑐 
1+2𝑐
 , 𝑓  (𝑥𝑚)  =  
𝑥𝑚 +𝑐 
1+2𝑐
  ,   𝑓(𝑥𝑢) =  
𝑥𝑢 +𝑐 
1+2𝑐
                                                  (12) 
where 𝑓 (𝑥𝑙), 𝑓(𝑥𝑚) and 𝑓(𝑥𝑢) depict transform functions for the lower, medium and  
upper bound of  entries in a decision matrix that are in the interval [-c, 1+c].  𝑥𝑙 , 𝑥𝑚, 𝑥𝑢 
are defined as the lower, medium and upper bound values of all elements of a fuzzy 
linguistic preference relation (FLPR) matrix. In addition, c is the least value of all 
elements in FLPR matrix, which are not in interval of [0,1]. 
3.4.2 Fuzzy linguistic preference relation procedure for weighing and ranking 
Step 1. Decision makers express their fuzzy opinions on a set of alternatives X = 
{𝑥1 , 𝑥2 … … 𝑥𝑛} in a decision problem with pairwise comparisons of the alternatives using 
fuzzy linguistic assessment variable and develop an incomplete consistent FLPR matrix 
?̃? = (?̃?𝑖𝑗)𝑛×𝑛 with only n-1 judgments {𝑝12, 𝑝23, … … . . , 𝑝𝑛−1𝑛}.  
Step 2. Develop a complete FLPR matrix ?̅̃? = (?̅?𝑖𝑗)𝑛×𝑛  by adopting the known elements 
in ?̃? and the reciprocal additive propositions to calculate the unknown elements in ?̃?.   
Step 3 Applying linguistic averaging operator to determine the average 𝐴?̃?  of the ith 







  for all 𝑖                                                                                                    (13)     
to calculate the averaged 𝐴?̃?  of  the ith alternative over other alternatives.                 
The weight  ?̃? of each alternative is estimated as:  
?̃? =  𝐴?̃?/ ∑ 𝐴?̃?
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                                                                            (14)        
Step 4. Defuzzification process of final fuzzy weight values of alternatives is based on 
the adoption of defuzzification techniques such as the Centre Of Area (COA), fuzzy mean 
and spread method and other methods like Mean Of Maximum (MOM), and 𝛼 cut. A 
simple approach using fuzzy mean and spread method by (Lee and Li, 1988) is utilized 
to obtain the crisp value of triangular fuzzy values. The fuzzy mean and spread method 
is reliable in terms of defuzzifying and ranking of fuzzy numbers because of its easiness 
to determine the optimum alternatives. The fuzzy mean and spread method for 
defuzzification is expressed as:  
x(?̃?𝑖) = (𝑙 + 𝑚 + 𝑢)/3                                                                                                  (15)  
x(?̃?𝑖) represent the fuzzy mean of a TFN, where 𝑙 and 𝑢 depict the lower and the upper 
bound of the TFN, and 𝑚 is the median value. 
Step 5. Determination of the optimum alternative from the highest value of fuzzy mean 
x(?̃?) values of all alternatives.  
Using the stated procedure above, a pairwise comparison FLPR matrix can be constructed 
easily based on (𝑛 − 1) judgments for 𝑛 criteria or alternatives.  
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Figure 4. Schematic of FLPR methodology for assessment and ranking of disruption 
risks of PRPU operation 
4. Case study 
A case study of an onshore complex petroleum refinery, with over 20 years of operation, 
reasonable management of change in organizational structure and policies, and fairly 
reliable safety standards, is considered for investigation. With the aim of reducing high 
risk of disruption of PRPU operation, the major challenge is how to determine the 
importance level of the risk elements and their attributes, which has been identified and 
approved by experts as the significant causes of disruption of PRPU operations.  For the 
purpose of this study, six experts are successfully convinced to participate in the 
assessment process.  
 Step 1: Identify risk elements and attributes associated with the disruption of 
PRPU operation  
Critical literature review and brainstorming sessions with experts and scholars having 
years of practical experiences can provide a comprehensive understanding of petroleum 
refinery process unit operations. This will provide the basic information for identification 
of significant risk elements and attributes that are observed and perceived to be a 
significant threat to PRPU operations. In this study, four major risk elements and sixteen 
attributes are considered as the major threat to PRPU operations.   
 Step 2: Develop the hierarchical structure  
The relationship between the four major risk elements and sixteen attributes that are 
identified is presented in the hierarchical structure. The hierarchical structure provides 
reliable information for the risk evaluation process in order to enhance effective risk 
management of PRPU operations.  
 Step 3: Linguistic assessment of risk elements and attributes  
The linguistic variable for pairwise comparison rating for the risk elements and their 
attributes are presented in Table 2. The pairwise comparisons of risk elements and their 
attributes in the hierarchical structure are established based on the experts’ judgement. A 
questionnaire was provided to experts with 5 to 20 or more years’ of experience, in order 
to obtain their opinion on the disruption risk of refinery process unit operations. The 
experts conduct the pairwise comparisons of the risk elements with respect to the goal. 
They also compared the attributes with respect to the risk elements. The weights of the 
experts that gave the judgements on the pairwise comparisons of the risk elements and 
their attributes are obtained. Table 4 shows the experts weights based on Delphi 
evaluation procedure.   





Qualification Weighting factor Weight of experts 
Consultant  10 years PhD 5+3+5 = 13  
13
74
     = 0.176 
Senior engineer 5 years Masters 4+2+4 = 10  
10
74
     = 0.135 
Senior engineer Over 20 years  Bachelor degree 4+5+3 = 12  
12
74
     = 0. 162 
Senior manager Over 20 years PhD 5+5+5 = 15  
15
74
    = 0.202   
Senior engineer 5 years Masters 4+2+4 = 10   
10
74
   = 0.135 
Senior manager Over 15 years PhD 5+4+5 = 14  
14
74
   = 0.19 
                   74                1 
To determine the overall value of experts for the pairwise comparison of risk elements 
and their attributes, the weight of each expert and their rating were aggregated. The six 
expert judgments assigned to the pairwise comparison of risk elements are used to 
calculate the overall experts’ judgement on each risk element and their attributes’ in the 
hierarchical model. Table 5 shows the linguistic variables assigned by the experts for 
pairwise comparisons of the risk elements with respect to the goal. The judgment of the 
six experts for the pairwise comparison of risk elements, and the aggregated value of the 
six expert judgement for risk elements with respect to the goal are presented in Tables 6 
and 7. Furthermore, each expert’s linguistic judgment of all the attributes in regard to the 
risk elements is presented in Table 8.    
 
Table 5: The linguistic terms of expert judgement for pairwise comparisons of risk 
elements 
 Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Expert 4 Expert 5 Expert 6  
𝐸1 LST ST EQ VS LST WS 𝐸2 
𝐸2 VS WS LST LVT VS EQ 𝐸3 
𝐸3 LVT ST LST ST VS VS 𝐸4 
 








Expert 5  
(0.135) 
Expert 6 (0.19)  



























(0.85, 0.9, 0.95) 𝐸4 
Table 7: Aggregated value of experts on pairwise comparisons of risk elements  
Risk elements Aggregated expert value Risk elements 
𝐸1 (0.52,0.57,0.62) 𝐸2 
𝐸2 (0.49,0.54,0.61) 𝐸3 
𝐸3 (0.56,0.61,0.67) 𝐸4 
 
Table 8: The linguistic terms of expert judgement for pairwise comparisons of 
attributes (FLRP) 
  Expert1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Expert 4 Expert 5 Expert 6  
𝐸1 𝐸11 LVS LST EQ VS LST EQ 𝐸12 
 𝐸12 ST VS AB EQ VS VS 𝐸13 
 𝐸13 VS ST LVS VT VS WS 𝐸14 
𝐸2 𝐸21 VS EQ LST ST VT VT 𝐸22 
 𝐸22 ST ST VS WS EQ VS 𝐸23 
 𝐸23 LST LST VS VS LVS LST 𝐸24 
 𝐸24 LVS WS VS EQ LVS LAB 𝐸25 
𝐸3 𝐸31 LVS EQ VS ST VS LST 𝐸32 
 𝐸32 VA EQ LST VS VS LWS 𝐸33 
 𝐸33 LST EQ VS ST LST ST 𝐸34 
𝐸4 𝐸41 ST LWS ST WS LST ST 𝐸42 
 𝐸42 VS LST WS EQ VS EQ 𝐸43 
 Step 5: Application of FLPR process to determine the weight of each risk element 
and their attributes in the hierarchical structure   
The weights of the risk elements and attributes of the disruption risk of PRPU operations 
are estimated using FLPR. Based on the application of FLPR procedure, the subjective 
response of experts can be transformed into quantitative variables to estimate the weight 
of risk elements and attributes presented in the hierarchical structure and rank them 
according to their level of importance.  
The feedback from the experts is utilised to construct an incomplete FLPR matrix for a 
set of n-1 preference values as stated in the FLPR process. The incomplete FLPR matrix 
values are represented in triangular fuzzy importance scale values as detailed in Table 2. 
The complete FLPR matrix is established using Step 2 of the FLPR procedure.  
The whole procedure for establishing the FLPR pairwise comparison matrix and the 
process of obtaining risk elements weights are illustrated in this study by presenting the 
evaluation of attributes with respect to a technical risk element. For example, the 
attributes defined as 𝐸11,  𝐸12,  𝐸13 and  𝐸14 , have only three pairwise comparison 
judgements (𝑝12, 𝑝23 𝑝34 ), which means comparisons from 𝐸11 to 𝐸12, from 𝐸12 to 𝐸13 
and from 𝐸13  to 𝐸14  are required to construct the fuzzy linguistic preference relation 
matrix. The pairwise comparison matrix structure for the attributes relating to the 
technical risk element is shown in Table 9.  Due to the differences in preferences and 
competencies of the experts, a questionnaire designed based on linguistic assessment 
variables is used to obtain fuzzy data on pairwise comparisons of the attributes relating 
to the technical risk element. The fuzzy data obtained from the experts is converted into 
triangular fuzzy values, which to construct the initial FLPR matrix as shown in Table 10. 
The proposition stated in Section 3.4.2, is used to develop the FLPR matrix of the 
attributes relating to the technical risk elements. 
Table 9: Pairwise comparison matrix structure for attributes relating to technical risk 
element 
Attributes 𝐸11 𝐸12 𝐸13 𝐸14 
𝐸11 𝑝11 𝑝12 𝑝13 𝑝14 
𝐸12 𝑝21 𝑝22 𝑝23 𝑝24 
𝐸13 𝑝31 𝑝32 𝑝33 𝑝34 
𝐸14 𝑝41 𝑝42 𝑝43 𝑝44 
 
Table 10: Incomplete FLPR pairwise comparison matrix of attributes with respect to 
technical risk element 
Attributes  𝐸11 𝐸12 𝐸13 𝐸14 
𝐸11 (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) (0.39, 0.43, 0.48) 𝑃13 𝑝14 
𝐸12 𝑝21 (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) (0.76, 0.81, 0.85) 𝑝24 
𝐸13 𝑝31 𝑝32 (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) (0.64, 0.69, 0.74) 
𝐸14 𝑝41 𝑝42 𝑝43 (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) 
 
Based on the FLPR process, an element 𝑝𝑖𝑗 can denote the ratio of the preference intensity 
of an attribute 𝑥𝑖 over attribute 𝑥𝑗 , which satisfy the condition that 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 0.5. Then, this 
condition implies that no difference exist between attributes 𝑥𝑖  and 𝑥𝑗  after pairwise 
comparison. In Table 9, this condition applies to the diagonal elements 𝑝11, 𝑝22, 𝑝33 and 
 𝑝44 in the matrix structure, which were presented as triangular fuzzy number (0.5, 0.5, 
0.5) as shown in Table 10. Also,  𝑝12,  𝑝23  and 𝑝34  indicate the 𝑛 − 1 pairwise 
comparisons of four attributes with respect to the technical risk element. Hence, the 
unknown elements in the matrix which are  𝑝13, 𝑝14, 𝑝21, 𝑝24, 𝑝31, 𝑝32 , 𝑝41, 𝑝42  and 
𝑝43 are calculated using the FLPR propositions. The complete FLPR matrix for the 
calculations above is shown in Table 11. The FPLR matrix has certain values, which are 
not in the interval [0, 1]. Therefore, the FPLR matrix is transformed using the transform 
function as stated in Section 3.4.1 to preserve the reciprocity and additive consistency of 
the matrix. Table 12 shows the transformed FLPR matrix. Using the same steps in the 
FLPR procedure, the FPLR matrices for other attributes with respect to their risk elements 
and that of the risk element with respect to the goal are estimated and presented in Tables 
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19. Furthermore, the average values (𝐴?̃?) , the weights(𝑊)̃, and 
the deffuziffied values of all risk elements and their attributes are calculated and presented 
in Table 20. Defuzzified values are obtained based on the fuzzy mean and spread method 
to perform ranking of the risk elements and their attributes according to the level of their 
importance.  
Table 11: Complete FLPR pairwise comparison matrix of attributes with respect to 
technical risk element 
 𝐸11 𝐸12 𝐸13 𝐸14 
𝐸11 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.39,0.43,0.48) (0.65,0.74,0.83) (0.79,0.98,1.07) 
𝐸12 (0.52,0.57,0.61) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.76,0.81,0.85) (0.90,1,1.09) 
𝐸13 (0.17,0.26,0.35) (0.15,0.19,0.24) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.64,0.69,0.74) 
𝐸14 (-0.07,0.28,0.46) (-0.09,0,0.10) (0.26,0.31,0.36) (0.50,0.50,0.50) 
 
Table 12: Transform FLPR matrix of technical risk element attributes 
 𝐸11 𝐸12 𝐸13 𝐸14 
𝐸11 (0.51,0.51,0.51) (0.41,0.45,0.50) (0.64,0.72,0.79)  (0.76,0.92,1.0) 
𝐸12 (0.53,0.57,0.60) (0.51,0.51,0.51) (0.73,0.78,0.82) (0.85,0.94, 1.0) 
𝐸13 (0.22,0.30,0.38) (0.21,0.24,0.28) (0.51,0.51,0.51) (0.63,0.67,0.72) 
𝐸14 (0.02,0.09,0.25) (0,0,0.16) (0.30,0.34,0.38) (0.51,0.51,0.51) 
 
Table 13: Incomplete FLPR pairwise comparison matrix of risk elements with respect 
to goal 
 𝐸1 𝐸2 𝐸3 𝐸4 
𝐸1 (0.5,0.5,0.5) (0.52,0.57,0.62) 𝑝13 𝑝14 
𝐸2 𝑝21 (0.5,0.5,0.5) (0.49,0.54,0.61) 𝑝24 
𝐸3 𝑝31 𝑝32 (0.5,0.5,0.5) (0.56,0.61,0.67) 





Table 14: Complete FLPR pairwise comparison matrix of risk elements with respect to 
goal 
  𝐸1 𝐸2 𝐸3 𝐸4 
𝐸1 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.52,0.57,0.62) (0.51,0.61,0.73) (0.57,0.72,0.90) 
𝐸2 (0.38,0.43,0.48) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.49,0.54,0.61) (0.55,0.65,0.78) 
𝐸3 (0.27,0.39,0.49) (0.39,0.46,0.51) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.56,0.61,0.67) 
𝐸4 (0.10,0.28,0.5) (0.22,0.35,0.45) (0.33,0.39,0.44) (0.50,0.50,0.50) 
 
Table 15: Complete FLRP pairwise comparison matrix attributes with respect to 
organizational risk element 
 𝐸21 𝐸22 𝐸23 𝐸24 𝐸25 
𝐸21 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.63,0.68,0.73) (0.83,0.93,1.03)  (0.74,0.87,1.04) (0.52,0.81,0.91) 
𝐸22 (0.27,0.32,0.37) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.70,0.75,0.80) (0.61,0.71,0.81) (0.39,0.53,0.68) 
𝐸23 (-0.03,0.07,0.17) (0.20,0.25,0.30) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.41,0.46,0.51) (0.19,0.28,0.38) 
𝐸24 (-0.04,0.13,0.26) (0.19,0.29,0.39) (0.49,0.54,0.59) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.28,0.32,0.37) 
𝐸25 (0.09,0.19,0.48) (0.32,0.47,0.61) (0.62,0.72,0.81) (0.63,0.68,0.72) (0.50,0.50,0.50) 
 
Table 16: Transformed FLRP matrix for organizational risk element attributes 
 𝐸21 𝐸22 𝐸23 𝐸24 𝐸25 
𝐸21 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.62,0.67,0.71) (0.81,0.90,0.99)  (0.72,0.84,1.0) (0.52,0.79,0.88) 
𝐸22 (0.29,0.33,0.38) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.69,0.73,0.78) (0.60,0.69,0.79) (0.40,0.54,0.67) 
𝐸23 (0.09,0.10,0.19) (0.22,0.27,0.32) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.41,0.46,0.51) (0.21,0.30,0.39) 
𝐸24 (0,0.16,0.28) (0.21,0.31,0.40) (0.49,0.54,0.58) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.31,0.33,0.38) 
𝐸25 (0.12,0.21,0.48) (0.33,0.47,0.60) (0.61,0.70,0.79) (0.62,0.67,0.70) (0.50,0.50,0.50) 
     
Table 17: Complete FLPR pairwise comparison matrix of attributes with respect to 
operational risk element 
 𝐸31 𝐸32 𝐸33 𝐸34 
𝐸31 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.50,0.55,0.60) (0.56,0.71,0.76) (0.69,0.74,0.89) 
𝐸32 (0.40,0.45,0.50) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.56,0.61,0.66) (0.09,0.19,0.29) 
𝐸33 (0.24,0.29,0.44) (0.34,0.39,0.44) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.53,0.58,0.63) 
𝐸34 (0.11,0.26,0.41) (0.71,0.81,0.91) (0.37,0.42,0.47) (0.50,0.50,0.50) 
 
Table 18: Complete FLPR pairwise comparison matrix of attributes with respect to 
external risk element 
 𝐸41 𝐸42 𝐸43 
𝐸41 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.56,0.61,0.66) (0.61,0.71,0.81) 
𝐸42 (0.34,0.39,0.44) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.55,0.60,0.65) 
𝐸43 (0.19,0.29,0.39) (0.35,0.40,0.45) (0.50,0.50,0.50) 
 
Table 19: Complete FLPR decision matrix for risk elements and attributes of PRPU 
operations 
 𝐸1 𝐸2 𝐸3 𝐸4  
𝐸1 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.52,0.57,0.62) (0.51,0.61,0.73) (0.57,0.72,0.9)  
𝐸2 (0.38,0.43,0.48) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.49,0.54,0.61) (0.55,0.65,0.78)  
𝐸3 (0.27,0.39,0.49) (0.39,0.46,0.51) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.56,0.61,0.67)  
𝐸4 (0.10,0.28,0.5) (0.22,0.35,0.45) (0.33,0.39,0.44) (0.50,0.50,0.50)  
𝐸1 𝐸11 𝐸12 𝐸13 𝐸14  
𝐸11 (0.51,0.51,0.51) (0.41,0.45,0.50) (0.64,0.72,0.79)  (0.76,0.92,1.0)  
𝐸12 (0.53,0.57,0.60) (0.51,0.51,0.51) (0.73,0.78,0.82) (0.85,0.94, 1.0)  
𝐸13 (0.22,0.30,0.38) (0.21,0.24,0.28) (0.51,0.51,0.51) (0.63,0.67,0.72)  
𝐸14 (0.02,0.09,0.25) (0,0,0.16) (0.30,0.34,0.38) (0.51,0.51,0.51)  
𝐸2 𝐸21 𝐸22 𝐸23 𝐸24 𝐸25 
𝐸21 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.62,0.67,0.71) (0.81,0.90,0.99)  (0.72,0.84,1.0) (0.52,0.79,0.88) 
𝐸22 (0.29,0.33,0.38) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.69,0.73,0.78) (0.60,0.69,0.79) (0.40,0.54,0.67) 
𝐸23 (0.09,0.10,0.19) (0.22,0.27,0.32) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.41,0.46,0.51) (0.21,0.30,0.39) 
𝐸24 (0,0.16,0.28) (0.21,0.31,0.40) (0.49,0.54,0.58) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.31,0.33,0.38) 
𝐸25 (0.12,0.21,0.48) (0.33,0.47,0.60) (0.61,0.70,0.79) (0.62,0.67,0.70) (0.50,0.50,0.50) 
𝐸3 𝐸31 𝐸32 𝐸33 𝐸34  
𝐸31 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.50,0.55,0.60) (0.56,0.71,0.76)  (0.69,0.74,0.89)  
𝐸32 (0.40,0.45,0.50) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.56,0.61,0.66) (0.09,0.19,0.29)  
𝐸33 (0.24,0.29,0.44) (0.34,0.39,0.44) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.53,0.58,0.63)  
𝐸34 (0.11,0.26,0.41) (0.71,0.81,0.91) (0.37,0.42,0.47) (0.50,0.50,0.50)  
𝐸4 𝐸41 𝐸42 𝐸43   
𝐸41 (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.56,0.61,0.66) (0.61,0.71,0.81)    
𝐸42 (0.34,0.39,0.44) (0.50,0.50,0.50) (0.55,0.60,0.65)   
𝐸43 (0.19,0.29,0.39) (0.35,0.40,0.45) (0.50,0.50,0.50)   
        
 










𝐸1 (0.53,0.60,0.69) (0.23,0.30,0.40) 0.31 0.30 1  
𝐸2 (0.48,0.53,0.59) (0.21,0.27,0.34) 0.27 0.26 2  
𝐸3 (0.42,0.49,0.52) (0.19,0.25,0.30) 0.25 0.24 3  
𝐸4 (0.57,0.72,0.9) (0.13,0.19,0.27) 0.20 0.20 4  
Attributes  
(Level 3) 




𝐸11 (0.58,0.65,0.7) (0.26,0.32,0.38) 0.28 0.30 0.090 2 
𝐸12 (0.65, 0.7, 0.71) (0.30,0.35,0.39) 0.35 0.36 0.1080 1 
𝐸13 (0.39,0.43,0.47) (0.12,0.19,0.26) 0.19 0.20 0.0600 7 
𝐸14 (0.21,0.24,0.33) (0.10,0.12,0.18) 0.13 0.14 0.0420 14 
       
𝐸21 (0.63,0.93,1.02) (0.21,0.34,0.47) 0.34 0.33 0.0858 3 
𝐸22 (0.50,0.56,0.62) (0.16,0.21,0.29) 0.22 0.21 0.0546 9 
𝐸23 (0.27,0.33,0.38) (0.09,0.12,0.18) 0.13 0.13 0.0334 16 
𝐸24 (0.33,0.37,0.43) (0.12,0.14,0.20) 0.15 0.14 0.0364 15 
𝐸25 (0.44,0.51,0.61) (0.14,0.19,0.28) 0.20 0.19 0.0494 13 
        
𝐸31 (0.56,0.63,0.69) (0.25,0.31,0.39) 0.32 0.31 0.0744 5 
𝐸32 (0.39,0.44,0.49) (0.17,0.22,0.27) 0.22 0.22 0.0528 11 
𝐸33 (0.40,0.44,0.50) (0.18,0.22,0.28) 0.23 0.23 0.0522 12 
𝐸34 (0.42,0.50,0.57) (0.19,0.24,0.32) 0.25 0.24 0.0576 8 
       
𝐸41 (0.56,0.61,0.66) (0.34,0.40,0.48) 0.40 0.40 0.0800 4 
𝐸42 (0.46,0.50,0.53) (0.28,0.33,0.39) 0.33 0.33 0.0660 6 
𝐸43 (0.35,0.40,0.45) (0.21,0.26,0.33) 0.27 0.27 0.0540 10 
 Step 5: Ranking decision 
The calculation of the weights and ranking of risk elements and their attributes according 
to their importance level is presented in Table 20. Based on the result obtained, the trend 
of the ranking in descending order of risk elements in level 2 of the hierarchical model 
indicates that 𝐸1 > 𝐸2 > 𝐸3 > 𝐸4 . Also, the trend of ranking of attributes in level 3 based 
on their global weight indicates that 𝐸12 > 𝐸11 > 𝐸21 > 𝐸41 > 𝐸31 > 𝐸42 >  𝐸13 >
 𝐸34 > 𝐸22 > 𝐸43 > 𝐸32 > 𝐸33 > 𝐸25 > 𝐸14 >  𝐸24 > 𝐸23 .   
5. Discussion  
The ranking order for the level 2 of the hierarchical model, indicates that technical and 
organizational risk elements are more critical in terms of causing the disruption risk of 
PRPU operations. Due to the closeness of the ranking value of organizational risk element 
and operational risk element, we can substantiate that organizational element are risk-
influencing elements that has received a lot of attention in safety/risk research. During 
the past decades, it studies is highly relevant for the operation of safety of socio technical 
systems (e.g. Rahimi and Rausand (2013); Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2011; Aven et al. 
2006 Sklet et al. 2005; Mearns et al. 2001). Various studies across a wide range of socio 
technical systems have shown a positive correlation between organisational factors and 
safety performance (Mearns et al., (2003) and Itoh et al., (2004) cited in Reiman and 
Rollenhagen, 2011). Thus, the outcome of the analyses in this study shows that 
organizational risk element is relevant in the context specific to organisational perspective 
on all aspects of safety of a petroleum refinery operation. Furthermore, indications from 
Bley et al. (1992) cited in Schönbeck et al. (2010), stated that any probabilistic risk model 
that fails to observe the organisational factors definitely undervalue the overall risk to an 
undetermined extent.  This line of thought clearly substantiate the ranking of 
organisational element above operational risk element in terms of contributing to 
disruption risk in a petroleum refinery domain.  
The ranking of the attributes in the level 3 of the hierarchical model, indicates that 
instrument failure, process equipment failure, inappropriate management policy, 
inappropriate decision making, deviation from operation procedure, inadequate 
maintenance procedure and natural hazard are considered as the most significant 
attributes in relation to the risk elements. At present, no benchmark is available, with 
which the ranking results from this study can be compared. Therefore, the observations 
from other related works to this research domain, are utilised to substantiate the ranking 
result in this study. For instance, Moura et al., (2016) analyse multi-attribute accident 
data set, which include major accidents in the petroleum refining industry. The result of 
the analysis indicates that equipment failure has a higher rate of recurrence in terms of 
triggering accidents, when compared to other accident triggering attributes such as 
inadequate procedure, inadequate communication, maintenance failure and management 
problem. Saleh et al., (2014), diagnose petroleum refinery accidents triggering attributes 
such as instrument failure, deviation from operational procedure, inadequate 
communication and poor/inadequate decisions. However, instrument failure was 
recognized and analysed in-depth more than the other attributes. This is because of its 
high probability of developing into an adverse latent condition, which can precipitate the 
occurrence of a major accident with catastrophic consequence. Kidam and Hurmes, 
(2013a), conduct a statistical review of major accident cases in the process industry. The 
analysis identifies that the main contributors to accidents are 78% technical causes, 20% 
organizational/human causes and 2% external causes. This outcome can be compared to 
the ranking result of the risk elements in the level 2 of the hierarchical model. Kidam and 
Hurmes (2013b), concerning the analysis of accident sub contributors indicates that 
equipment/instrument failure, and deviation from operation procedure, are more critical, 
when compared to other accident sub-contributors relating to inadequate maintenance, 
inadequate communication (poor communication) and inadequate decision-making 
(misjudgment). Zhang and Zheng, (2012) probe the root causes of accidents in the process 
industries in China. The findings from their work indicate that active 
equipment/instrument failure is the highest causative factors, when compared to other 
critical events such as deviation from operation procedure, piping failure, natural hazard 
and human related causes. Furthermore, Underwood and Waterson (2014) indicated that 
traditional cause and effect accident models suggest that complex systems accidents are 
initiated by risky occurrence such as catastrophic equipment failure.  
The lowest ranked attributes in relation to the risk elements are poor safety monitoring 
and audit, utility system failure and lack of safety training/drill. This does not suggest that 
they are not likely to initiate disruption risk of PRPU operations, but their critical level is 
relatively low when compared to the other attributes.  Based on the rationalisation 
provided to support the ranking results in this research, it is envisaged that the ranking 
results are a reliable risk information source to support the risk management process in a 









Addressing the issue of disruption risk of PRPU operations is very crucial in order to 
prevent the risk of catastrophic accidents in a petroleum refinery domain. This study 
presents a novel methodology using fuzzy linguistic preference relation approach to 
evaluate the risk elements and attributes which can cause disruption of PRPU operations. 
The fuzzy linguistic preference relation is utilised to analyse the hierarchical structure of 
disruption risk of the PRPU operations and to determine the weights of risk elements and 
attributes, and to obtain the final ranking. In addition, fuzzy linguistic preference relation 
effectively addresses the uncertainty and the imprecision from subjective judgements of 
domain experts.  
The subjective judgement of multiple experts on four risk elements and sixteen attributes 
of PRPU disruption risk is represented as fuzzy linguistic assessment variables, which are 
expressed by triangular fuzzy values to overcome vagueness or ambiguity of the 
judgements and for easy computation process. Using the FLPR approach provides the 
most convenient way to reduce the number of pairwise comparisons of risk elements and 
attributes in a questionnaire sent to domain experts. The questionnaire allows experts to 
express their response in a consistent manner without prejudice. The result in this study 
provides valuable reference to duty holders and stakeholders of petroleum refineries to 
improve their perception about how risk elements and attributes can be critically 
prioritised in the risk management process. The methodology proves to be a dependable 
evaluation procedure in terms of its flexibility and ease of application, when compared to 
other hierarchical modelling methods like fuzzy AHP, which requires more information 
and consistency checks in the decision making process. Finally, this study has 
demonstrated that the proposed methodology provides a resourceful, yet flexible 
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